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By KENNETH ROGOFF*
It appears likely that the number of currencies
in the world, having proliferated along with the
number of countries over the past 50 years, will
decline sharply over the next two decades. The
question I plan to pose here is: where, from an
economic point of view, should we aim for
this process to stop? Should there be a single
world currency, as Richard Cooper (1984)
boldly envisioned? Should there remain mul-
tiple major currencies but with a much stricter
arrangement among them for stabilizing ex-
change rates, as say Ronald McKinnon (1984)
or John Williamson (1993) recommended?
1
Building on Maurice Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000b, d), I will argue here that the status
quo arrangement among the dollar, yen, and
euro (which I take to be benign neglect) is not
far from optimal, not only for now but well
into the new century. And it would remain a
good system even if political obstacles to
achieving greater monetary policy coordina-
tion (or even a common world currency) could
be overcome. Again, this is not a paper on, say,
the pros and cons of dollarization for small and
medium-sized economies, but rather on ar-
rangements among the core currencies.
Any blueprint for the future core of the world
currency system involves some crystal-ball
gazing. But at the same time, recent research
in international macroeconomics offers sev-
eral important insights that can help inform
the discussion.
I. The Exchange-Rate Disconnect Puzzle
The typical assessment of the modern ﬂoating-
rate era begins by noting just how wrong Milton
Friedman (1953) was when he envisioned ﬂex-
ible exchange rates as adjusting slowly and
smoothly in response to differentials in relative
national price levels. Nothing could be further
from the truth, and as virtually everyone knows
by now, exchange rates ﬂuctuate wildly in com-
parison with goods prices. Early in the ﬂexible-
rate experience, theorists offered what appeared
to be an attractive answer to this observation:
currency is a durable, so fundamentally its price
reﬂects a ﬂow of future services, not simply its
transactions value at a point in time. Thus, ac-
cording to the “asset” view of exchange rates, it
should be no surprise that they ﬂuctuate almost
as wildly as stock prices.
Although the stock price analogy is useful, it
is far from perfect. Given that domestic goods
prices tend to move very sluggishly, at least at
the consumer level, one would think that goods-
market arbitrage would prevent the exchange
rate from ﬂuctuating like a typical major stock
price index—but, of course, it does. At the
aggregate level, shocks to real exchange rates
damp out at a remarkably slow rate. Even the
most optimistic estimates put the half-life of
real exchange-rate movements in years, not
months (though as Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000a]
demonstrate, a country’s terms of trade at the
wholesale level seem to react much faster than
at the consumer level). The “purchasing-power-
parity puzzle” is but one manifestation of a
broader range of puzzles which Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000b) call “the exchange-rate discon-
nect puzzle.” Simply put, while the exchange
rate seems to gyrate wildly, it does not appear to
feed back into the real economy with nearly the
force and speed that one would expect for such
an important relative price. (Again, remember
that my focus is on cross-country exchange
rates between the largest economies.) Marianne
Baxter and Alan Stockman (1989), in their com-
parison of macroeconomic variables under ﬁxed
and ﬂexible exchange-rate regimes, ﬁrst pointed
out the difﬁculty in demonstrating that exchange-
rate volatility affects macroeconomic quantities.
Though more recent research has succeeded in
showing that exchange-rate volatility can impact
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2 overall the
feedback to the real economy is far slower and
less pronounced than canonical Mundell-Fleming
models would predict. Some have gone so far
as to interpret the evidence as showing that
exchange rates have no short-run expenditure-
switching effect at all, but this seems an over-
statement (see e.g., the evidence surveyed in
Paul Krugman [1991]).
Therefore, although ﬂexible exchange rates
have indeed proved far more volatile than Fried-
man envisioned, the ﬂip side of the coin is also
a surprise. The effects of the volatility are not as
conspicuously disastrous as one might have
guessed. So what’s the catch, and how should it
affect our thinking about exchange-rate regimes?
II. Goods Markets Are Less Integrated
than One Might Imagine
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) argue that a
broad variety of puzzles related to international
capital markets can be substantially resolved if
one incorporates (signiﬁcant but plausible)
costs of trading goods into canonical models of
international trade. (Trade costs include not
only tariffs and transport costs, but also costs
related to differences in language, legal sys-
tems, and yes, possibly currencies). The puzzles
include the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (current
accounts tend to be small relative to saving and
investment), the home-bias-in-equities puzzle,
the international-consumption-correlations puz-
zle (comovements in national consumptions are
not as large as one would expect with signiﬁcant
global capital-market integration), and other
puzzles including the purchasing-power-parity
puzzle and the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle.
Incorporating trade costs not only allows one to
resolve most of the major empirical puzzles in
international macroeconomics at a qualitative
level, but simple calculations suggest that the
puzzles can be (substantially) explained at a
quantitative level as well. Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000b) do not deny the importance of frictions
in capital markets, which they take to be at least
as large internationally as domestically. But,
they argue, one need not rely on any large
difference between domestic and international
capital-market frictions to explain many appar-
ent puzzles concerning why capital-market in-
tegration is signiﬁcantly less than one would
imagine.
The way in which trade frictions can help
explain the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle is
straightforward. If the share of traded goods is
relatively small (or, to be precise, if trade costs
keep the consumption of traded goods relatively
small), then the exchange rate (the terms of
trade) will likely play a relatively small role
in the economy. Correspondingly, very large
exchange-rate movements may be required be-
fore there is a signiﬁcant effect on the overall
economy. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000c) illus-
trate how a sudden reversal of the United States’
4.3-percent (of GDP) year-2000 current-
account deﬁcit could lead to an extremely sharp
depreciation of the dollar exchange rate.
III. Implications For Exchange-Rate Regimes
Most critics of the current exchange-rate sys-
tem accept the point that, under ﬁxed rates (or a
common currency), countries would lose their
ability to pursue independent monetary policy,
and that this loss would be signiﬁcant. The
exact cost depends on a variety of factors, most
conspicuously the correlation of macroeco-
nomic conditions across regions. If trade be-
tween two large regions is relatively small, and
if trade costs also limit capital-market interac-
tions (as Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000b] contend),
then standard models imply that it makes little
sense to choose the exchange rate as the funda-
mental target of monetary policy.
Advocates of greater exchange-rate stability
across the major currencies argue that standard
theoretical and empirical analyses of the efﬁ-
cacy of exchange-rate stabilization are mis-
guided, because they typically assume rational
exchange markets. Even if some degree of
exchange-rate ﬂexibility across two regions is
desirable (say, to accommodate required move-
ments in the real exchange rate due to imperfect
output correlation), in reality the exchange rate
ﬂuctuates far more than any plausible theory
would dictate. Thus a system of ﬁxed exchange
rates (or currency uniﬁcation) is still preferable
to any likely scenario under ﬂexible rates.
2 See, for example, Jeffrey Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei
(1993) or Linda Goldberg and Michael Klein (1998), though
their developing-country results do not necessarily extrap-
olate to OECD countries. Indeed, the strongest case for
stabilizing major currency exchange rates may well rest on the
way in which their volatility impacts developing countries.
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bust to this objection. First, with a high de-
gree of goods-market segmentation, small
changes in the fundamentals can easily lead to
large (fully rational) changes in exchange
rates (as Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000c] illus-
trate). Second, even if a signiﬁcant share of
exchange-rate ﬂuctuations is indeed driven
purely by, say, investor psychology, the feed-
back to the real economy may not be so great
as world-currency advocates maintain. Thus,
the mere fact that exchange rates between the
yen, the euro, and the dollar ﬂuctuate wildly
does not provide a prima facie case that we
should permanently ﬁx them.
Now, clearly, if moving to a currency union
eliminates a substantial bulk of the costs that
limit goods- and capital-market integration,
suddenly the efﬁcacy of the common currency
would be self-fulﬁlling. However, I am skepti-
cal that this would be the case, notwithstanding
the interesting evidence Andrew Rose (2000)
provides on the currency arrangements of mini-
states. It is true that the common currency may
ultimately coincide with much higher trade
within Europe, but attributing the rise singularly
to the adoption of a common currency would
seem naive. In fact, at the same time countries
in Europe have been pursuing a common-
currency arrangement, they have taken numer-
ous other steps toward economic integration,
ranging from coordination of electric-plug sizes
to standardization of supervision and regulation
of banks and ﬁnancial intermediaries. There is a
good analogy in the old fable of nail soup: A
beggar, trying to talk his way in out of the cold,
claims that he can make a most delicious soup
with only a nail. The farmer lets him in, and the
beggar stirs the soup, saying how good it will
taste, but how it would be even better if he
could add a leek. After similarly convincing his
host to contribute a chicken and all sorts of
other good things, the beggar pulls out the
magic nail, and indeed, the soup is delicious.
The euro is the nail.
IV. Other Reasons To Be Cautious About
Adopting a Single World Currency
There are other reasons that it may not be
desirable to pursue currency consolidation all
the way to a single world currency:
(i) Absent a global government, it would be
difﬁcult to establish adequate checks and
balances on a global central bank. The U.S.
Federal Reserve is technically indepen-
dent, but it is also fundamentally a creature
of Congress, one that could in principle be
dissolved at short notice. Although the nas-
cent government institutions of the Euro-
pean Community are still fairly weak, they
nevertheless provide some forum for su-
pervision of the European Central Bank.
Into the foreseeable future, no parallel in-
stitution is going to exist at the global
level.
(ii) More generally, political problems could
make it difﬁcult to choose top-notch cen-
tral bankers and, equally importantly, con-
servative central bankers who place a
strong weight on inﬂation. In principle,
one can design mechanical rules (such as
inﬂation targets) which reduce the impor-
tance of the individuals governing the cen-
tral bank. In many developing countries,
this second-best approach may indeed be
far preferable to a random draw from the
political process, but I am very skeptical
of claims that any simple mechanical rule
can come close to what can be achieved
by a grandmaster of monetary policy such
as Alan Greenspan. This is indeed a com-
mon ﬁnding in the artiﬁcial-intelligence
literature; that is, computers can equal “ex-
pert” level in many ﬁelds but not “master”
level.
(iii) Though currency, particularly in its func-
tion as a unit of account, is a natural mo-
nopoly, there are several reasons why it
may be desirable to maintain some level of
competition. Through a number of chan-
nels, global currency competition provides
a check on inﬂation (as illustrated, for ex-
ample, in Rogoff [1985]). A related con-
cern comes from the natural regulatory
functions that a global central bank (or a
sister agency) would have to assume. In an
era of ongoing ﬁnancial innovation, in
which paper currency may well become
defunct, there are ample reasons to be con-
cerned that a global central bank might
constrain innovation, either out of the de-
sire to maintain a strong monopoly or sim-
ply due to misjudgment. These are also
going to be problems in the current system,
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having a single currency.
(iv) One could bypass many of the objections I
have raised by adopting a world currency
pegged to a commodity basket (or just, say,
to gold). However, I believe that the in-
vention of the modern central bank, on
the whole, has actually been a very good
one, and certainly not worth abandoning
for the uncertain gains of global currency
uniﬁcation.
V. Why Not a Lessor Level of Coordination
among the Big Three (Euro, Dollar, and Yen)?
Even if an optimal system requires some de-
gree of monetary response to exchange rates,
there is a case to be made that the current
system already works reasonably well. Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000d) show that when monetary
policy is governed by a rule-based environment
(i.e., if standard time consistency in monetary
policy problems can be overcome), then the
gains to international monetary cooperation are
not necessarily very large. While in principle
countries may be tempted to tilt their rules in a
way that improves their individual terms of
trade (via the effects of risk on wage- and price-
setting) or that provides a more favorable cor-
relation between consumption and the exchange
rate, theory suggests good reasons to believe
that these gains are likely to be only second-
order. Loosely speaking, improvements in the
terms of trade come only at the expense of less
effective risk-sharing. In empirical simulations,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000d) ﬁnd that the gains
to having an optimal global exchange-rate sys-
tem (over the noncooperative equilibrium) are
two orders of magnitude less than the gains
from following active versus passive monetary
stabilization policy. Interestingly, the argument
here does not depend at all on having sizable
trade costs, and indeed the need for global co-
ordination in rule-setting is weakest at the ex-
tremes where either all goods are traded or no
goods are traded. Of course, one can argue that
some of the world’s major central banks (nota-
bly the European Central Bank and the Bank of
Japan) have not yet fully converged to a rule-
based equilibrium, in which case there is still
scope for coordination in the transition.
VI. Conclusions
Currency consolidation seems like a desir-
able and (at present) likely process; but it is
already important to begin thinking about where
consolidation should stop. I have argued here
that, into the foreseeable future, it would not be
desirable to aim for a single world currency, and
that from an economic point of view, it would
be preferable to retain at least, say, three or four
currencies, if not n currencies.
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